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ABSTRACT
Despite significant literature on the electoral and democratic implications of laws that restore the right to vote to individuals with felony convictions,
few scholars have explored whether these reforms result in practical changes.
This Article examines the effect of administrative capacity and individual experience on policy implementation and finds that, even in the face of de jure
felon rights restoration, policymakers can (knowingly or unwittingly) alter de
facto restoration. Specifically, states have limited administrative capacity to
absorb the costs of rights restoration. As a result, the burden of restoration
falls onto citizens. Facing learning, compliance, and psychological hurdles to
the right to vote, many individuals with felony convictions simply do not have
the resources to restore their civil rights. Put simply, even the best laid plans
often go awry when it comes to the burden of policy implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2018, almost 65% of Florida voters voted “Yes” on a citizen-initiated constitutional amendment to restore voting rights to citizens with
felony convictions after they have completed their sentence (“Amendment
4”).1 The vote is part of a national movement for disenfranchisement policy
reform and citizen rights restoration. Estimates suggest that, since 1997, 1.4
million citizens in twenty three states have regained the right to vote as a result
of legal changes to disenfranchisement policy.2
Yet, while reforms have provided the legal opportunity for rights restoration, questions remain about whether such reforms result in practical changes
for citizens with felony convictions. For example, in the first three months
after Amendment 4 became effective, less than 0.2% of the citizens affected by
the Amendment registered to vote (2,000 of 1.4 million).3 Part of this is due to
questions among citizens and state officials regarding voter eligibility. Kelly
Corder, director of communications for the Florida Commission on Offender
Review (“FCOR”) – one of the agencies tasked with identifying individuals
eligible for restoration – noted that the agency had “temporarily postponed consideration of pending applications for restoration of civil rights while the new
framework required to implement the constitutional changes [wa]s defined.”4
Similarly, many county elections supervisors implored the state legislature to

1. Florida Amendment 4, CNN POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/results/florida/ballot-measures/1 [perma.cc/D4SF-2T59]. The resulting constitutional language is as follows:
(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to
be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability. Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, any disqualification from voting arises from a felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon completion of all
terms of sentence including parole or probation.
(b) No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense shall be qualified
to vote until restoration of rights.

FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
2. Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote: Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement Reform, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/expanding-vote-two-decades-felony-disenfranchisement-reforms/ [perma.cc/Z6ND-3MXK].
3. Kevin Morris, Thwarting Amendment 4, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1–2 (May
9,
2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/thwarting-amendment-4
[perma.cc/484F-M2AT].
4. Daniel Rivero, No One Seems To Know How Amendment 4 Will Be Implemented To Restore Felon’s Right to Vote, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (WLRN) (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/no-one-seems-know-how-amendment-4-will-be-implemented-restore-felons-right-vote [perma.cc/B8EM-2DHK].
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provide them with guidance interpreting the Amendment.5 Such guidance clarifying the parameters of the state’s responsibilities for administering Amendment 4 did not become law until more than six months after Amendment 4
became effective.6 Rights restoration likely will require implementing legislation and administrative action by, at minimum, the Florida Department of Corrections, the Department of Law Enforcement, the Department of State, and
each of the county supervisors of elections.7 In the meantime, local election
administrators have little real guidance on voter eligibility, allowing for a potential of “67 supervisors of election interpreting” the law in different ways.8
Much of the debate and discussion surrounding felon disenfranchisement
and reenfranchisement centers on the constitutionality of disenfranchisement
or the passage of reform bills. Yet, as the example of Florida suggests, a major
obstacle to rights restoration is administrative in nature. In most states, only a
modest number of citizens achieve de facto restoration of rights because the
procedures governing reenfranchisement are confusing and the burden of pursuing restoration falls on the citizen.9 The lack of attention to administration
of restoration policy is concerning because it provides little insight into the
factors that determine whether citizens’ votes are restored in practice.10
Despite the fact that most administrators operate in relative obscurity,
their actions and decisions play a critical role in politics; the vast majority of
conflict between governments and citizens tends to take place in the administrative, rather than public, political arena.11

5. Lawrence Mower, Ron DeSantis Signs Amendment 4 Bill, Limiting Felon Voting, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/06/28/ron-desantis-signs-amendment-4-bill-limiting-felon-voting/
[perma.cc/TG6Z-MAMN].
6. Letter from Ron DeSantis, Governor of Fla., to Laurel Lee, Fla. Sec. of State,
On Senate Bill 7066 (June 28, 2019), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/6.282.pdf [perma.cc/9KLU-GRUZ].
7. Rivero, supra note 4.
8. Daniel Rivero, Is Florida’s Amendment Restoring Felons’ Voting Rights
“Self-Executing”?,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Dec.
30,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/30/680994515/is-floridas-amendment-restoring-felonsvoting-rights-self-executing [perma.cc/Z6DY-CQU2].
9. Marc Mauer & Tushar Kansal, Barred for Life: Voting Rights Restoration in
Permanent Disenfranchisement States, THE SENT’G PROJECT 2–3 (2005),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Barred-for-Life-Voting-Rights-Restoration-in-Permanent-Disenfranchisement-States.pdf [perma.cc/6T5TYC56].
10. See Thessalia Merivaki, Access Denied? Investigating Voter Registration Rejections in Florida, 19 ST. POL. & POL’Y 53, 54 (2019) (noting that existing work on
election administration has only just begun to understand the dynamics of voter registration processing).
11. Lael R. Keiser & Joe Soss, With Good Cause: Bureaucratic Discretion and
the Politics of Child Support, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1133, 1133 (Oct. 1988); Michael
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To use a legal metaphor, citizens who interact with the state to access their
rights find themselves in an administrative courtroom. In some cases, they are
given the presumption of innocence, and little is required of them. “But in
other cases, the citizen is treated with suspicion and must prove their [sic] innocence by negotiating a demanding set of administrative burdens.”12
Sweeping policy change without knowledge of the administrative hurdles
imposed brings implementation risks, particularly in election administration
where authority is decentralized and administrators have substantial discretion
and limited resources.13
In order to help make sense of how the administration of voting rights
restoration reforms influence citizens’ civil rights, this Article utilizes the concept of administrative burden. Put simply, administrative burden consists of
the learning, compliance, and psychological costs citizens experience when interacting with government.14 These costs make a difference in citizens lives,
affect some groups more than others, and often reinforce inequities in society.15
Furthermore, they are the product of deliberate choices made in the political
arena.16
Administrative burden is particularly relevant when citizens exercise their
democratic rights through voting.17 When election administrators struggle to
implement policy, often without any real guidance from their principals in the
legislative or executive branches, they must make decisions about how much
burden to absorb and what costs to pass on to citizens. Financial resources,
expertise, and organizations within which administrators operate affect these
decisions. With respect to the restoration of voting rights for citizens with felony convictions, there is limited administrative capacity to absorb the costs of
policy implementation. Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that all administrators operate under the same conditions, individual experiences with the
government condition the effects of policy change. Rights restoration requires
that citizens have accurate information about eligibility, have the ability to allocate resources for compliance with eligibility requirements, and are able to
overcome the frustration, stress, and sense of helplessness that often results
from government interaction. These burdens often impede restoration reform.
Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV.
3, 5 (Mar. 1984).
12. Donald Moynihan & Pamela Herd, Red Tape and Democracy: How Rules Affect Citizenship Rights, 40 AM. R. PUB. ADMIN. 654, 658 (2010).
13. See Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P. Moynihan, Early Voting and Election Day Registration in the Trenches: Local Officials’ Perceptions of Election Reform, 10 ELECTION L.J. 89, 89 (2011).
14. PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN:
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 22 (2018)
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id.
17. Donald Moynihan, Pamela Herd & Hope Harvey, Administrative Burden:
Learning, Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State Interactions, 25 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 43, 45 (2014).
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In Part I, this Article examines election administration in the context of
public administration. Part I argues that, too often, policymakers and scholars
conflate laws with the government’s administration of and citizen experience
with those laws. This is particularly true in the area of felon disenfranchisement and citizen rights restoration. The combination of decentralization and
discretion in the American electoral system means that the implementation of
policies designed to restore citizens’ rights likely varies across jurisdictions.
Part II applies the concept of administrative burden to explain this variation. After defining the concept of administrative burden and making some
assumptions about the policy process, Part II discusses the effect of administrative capacity and citizen experience on policy implementation. The context
in which administrators operate and citizens’ ability to advocate for their civil
rights have consequences for the effectiveness of any legal regime of voting
rights restoration. As a result, even in the face of de jure rights restoration,
policymakers can alter de facto restoration with seemingly apolitical statutory
language.
Throughout Parts I and II, this Article discusses the application of a single
legal framework across a range of jurisdictions but uses the example of Florida’s Amendment 4 to illustrate key points. Part III explores more explicitly
Amendment 4’s implementing legislation and addresses the administrative
complications that arise from the legislation. In doing so, that Part identifies
concerns about administrative capacity and discusses individuals’ likely experiences with the administration of that legislation. Finally, Part III identifies
the political context in which administrators implement Florida’s rights restoration policy and speculates on the likelihood of legislative, administrative, or
judicial recourse.

I. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Public administration contemplates the relationship between administrators, political leaders, and citizens in the pursuit of sound governance.18 Policymakers and citizens alike understand that government agencies play a key
role in informing, guiding, and even coercing citizen behavior consistent with
community goals.19 In the context of elections, examples of how government
agencies shape citizen behavior abound. For example, the Federal Election
Commission administers and formulates policy with respect to campaign finance law,20 the U.S. Election Assistance Commission exists to develop guidance on federal statutory requirements relating to voting systems and voter

18. James H. Svara, The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and
Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration, 61 PUB. ADMIN. R.
176, 179 (2001).
19. BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 11 (2d ed. 2014).
20. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (2018).
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access,21 each state has a chief election official or board that administers election law,22 and local governments delegate to specific officials the authority to
register voters and administer elections.23 These examples suggest that “[e]lection administration is public administration.”24
Those who consider public administration in the law tend to focus on the
external or statutory factors that govern the relationship between administrators
and citizens.25 Rich debate over statutory language and well-developed theories of judicial statutory interpretation are hallmarks of legal discussions on the
subject.26 However, how administrative agencies interpret their statutory mandates and implement policy in their day-to-day operations receives comparatively less attention.27 This is problematic, as internal agency procedures and
practices are the most powerful determinants of administrative action.28
Nowhere is this truer than in election administration. Policymakers and
scholars alike focus less on understanding and improving the relationship between the administrative process and citizen participation in elections and more
on the statutory and constitutional language designed to structure the dynamic.29 Certainly, the legal framework that governs our electoral process is
of tremendous importance. However, in the context of election administration
generally and in citizen rights restoration specifically, it is all too common for
policymakers and scholars to conflate laws with government implementation

21. 52 U.S.C. § 20922 (2018).
22. KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL

ROLE IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 12–13 (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45549.pdf [perma.cc/8WFN-95WL].
23. See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGIS. (June 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx [perma.cc/JQ4J-3QJM].
24. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 18 (2014), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-VotingExper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [perma.cc/R5KJ-EP63].
25. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1518
(2015).
26. See Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 871, 874 (2015).
27. Metzger, supra note 25, at 1520–21; Stack, supra note 27, at 874.
28. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 313 (2012).
29. R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Controlling Democracy: The PrincipalAgent Problems in Election Administration, 34 POL. STUD. J. 491, 492 (2006); but see
Charles R. Wise, Election Administration in Crisis: An Early Look at Lessons from
Bush versus Gore, 61 PUB. ADMIN. R. 131, 137 (2001)
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of and citizen experience with those laws.30 This leads to a persistent lack of
attention to the actual (not hypothesized) implications of the law31 and puzzling
management of our electoral system. As a result, it remains true that “[t]here
is probably no other phase of public administration in the United States which
is so badly managed as the conduct of elections.”32
Part of this is by design – uniformity and management were not fundamental considerations in modeling American electoral institutions.33 Instead,
a commitment to geographically based representation is the hallmark of American elections.34 The decentralized process provided by the Elections Clause
of the U.S. Constitution ensures that the regulation and administration of elections occur primarily at the state level.35 This means the legal framework governing both federal and state elections varies across the country, as states administer and apportion responsibility between state and local governments in
different ways.36 Indeed, officials in approximately 8,000 different jurisdictions are responsible for administering American elections.37 This incredible
variation not only makes governing the electoral process complex but also has
implications for how administrators implement and citizens experience that
framework. Thus, any discussion of citizen rights restoration policy must include serious consideration of administration in addition to statutory text.
In order to understand the implications of public administration for rights
restoration policy, this Article assumes that any legal framework governing the
restoration of voting rights for citizens who have a felony conviction applies
uniformly across all jurisdictions. For example, the mandate of Florida’s
30. See Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P. Moynihan, The Effect of Administrative Burden on Bureaucratic Perception of Policies: Evidence from Election Administration, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 741, 742 (2012).
31. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
32. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1934).
33. ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE 11, 105 (2009)
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 4 (“The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators”); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of
Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127
(2009).
36. Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752–
53 (2016).
37. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., supra note 24, at 1. Kimball
and Baybeck find the exact number of localities is 7,858. David C. Kimball & Brady
Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Election Administration, 12
ELECTION L.J. 130, 131 (2013) (but noting that just 462 jurisdictions serve more than
two-thirds of all American voters).
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Amendment 4 applies equally to all citizens in the state.38 However, despite
the claims of some, such legal mandates are not “self-executing.”39 This means
that there is variation in the implementation of the legal framework. State administrators must implement the mandate when interacting with citizens but
often do so in different ways. In the case of Amendment 4, while statutory
law guides administrators in their interactions with citizens who seek to register
to vote, for a variety of reasons, those administrators may not implement the
law in a uniform manner.
Two aspects of election administration are particularly relevant when
thinking about how administrators implement legal mandates. First, the decentralized nature of our electoral process means that, even when faced with the
same statutory text, efforts to restore citizens’ rights will likely vary across jurisdictions. Second, the amount of discretion built into election administration
results in potential for differential implementation of the law.

A. Decentralization in Election Administration
The number of state and local jurisdictions that have authority over elections has led many to refer to election administration as “hyperfederalized.”40
While the federal government does have power to regulate elections, state delegation constitutes the vast majority of election law and policy.41 Most states
vest a majority of election administration in local officials and retain some formal role for election oversight at the state level.42 In addition to the allotment
of authority from the federal to the state and local level, fragmentation also
occurs across and within units.43 State involvement in overseeing election administration differs across the country, and there is much variation in administration at the sub-state level.44 Thus, the American electoral system is one
that is classified by both vertical and horizontal decentralization.45
38. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
39. E.g., Patricia Mazzei, Florida Felons Once Denied Rights Begin Registering

to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/florida-felons-voting-rights.html [perma.cc/27P4-WDFN]; Press Release, ACLU of Fla., Statement on Senate Bill Restricting Amendment 4 (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/aclu-florida-statement-senate-bill-restrictingamendment-4 [perma.cc/6JJR-89VL].
40. E.g., EWALD, supra note 33, at 3 (2009); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin
of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 952 (2005).
41. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 36, at 753.
42. Id. at 779–80.
43. SHANTON, supra note 22, at 2.
44. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2314, 2324 (2005).
45. Robert S. Montjoy, The Public Administration of Elections, 68 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 788, 789 (2008).
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This decentralization affects the uniformity of the American electoral process and the capacity of governmental units to administer elections.46 In a
highly decentralized system, understanding the state and local factors that influence administration is essential.47 With respect to felon disenfranchisement
and reenfranchisement, this means one must examine closely whether administrators implement rules uniformly. If the factors that shape implementation
vary across or within units, then the way administrators apply the law necessarily will differ depending upon locale as well.48 The way administrators remove and restore citizens’ rights will likely differ based upon organizational
and other structural environments, even in the presence of a uniform set of
standards.49 For example, in her 2002-2003 interviews with county election
boards, Professor Jessie Allen found that about half of New York counties required documentary proof of eligibility for citizens with felony convictions to
register to vote despite there being no legal mandate for such documentation.50
Even when the New York State Board of Elections attempted to impose uniformity by issuing a memo to all county commissioners, differences in county
practices remained.51 Little follow up by the State Board regarding policy implementation after the initial memo, combined with tremendous variation in
commissioners’ abilities to change routinized practices, resulted in many
county commissioners continuing to operate as they did before the State
Board’s attempts at clarification.

B. Election Administrators’ Discretion
Part of the variation in election administration results from the discretion
granted to administrators. When regulating elections, the legislature inevitably
delegates authority to election administrators and specifies the duties of different public officials. As discussed above, states vary with respect to the amount
of discretion legislators delegate to administrators.52 Yet any delegation of

Id.
Merivaki, supra note 10, at 54.
See Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1134.
See e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 57, 69 (2019); Comment, Block the Vote: How a New Wave of State Election
Laws is Rolling Unevenly Over Voters and the Dilemma of How to Prevent It, 43 CUMB.
L. REV. 95, 96 (2012).
50. Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389, 417
(2011).
51. Id. at 419–20.
52. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role
of State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 356 (2008); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, One Person,
One Vote: Protecting Access to Franchise through the Effective Administration of Election Procedures and Protections, 40 URB. LAW. 269, 270–73 (2008).
46.
47.
48.
49.
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power grants some measure of discretion,53 and even the relatively specific
statutes that voting rights advocates view as accommodating can add procedural complications to administration.54
Interpretation and implementation of the law is inevitably a nuanced endeavor over which reasonable administrators can disagree.55 While the legal
restrictions placed on administrators by the Constitution, federal statutes, state
constitutions, state legislators, and federal and state judges set the boundaries
within which administrators operate, local administrators likely interpret and
implement those policies in different ways.56 This is particularly true with respect to voter eligibility, where the law is especially complex. Many states fail
to develop administrative guidelines, and those that do often produce complicated, confusing, or conflicting procedures.57
Furthermore, felon disenfranchisement and rights restoration policies
tend to be couched in vague language and involve far more administrative discretion than simple voter registration.58
As noted by Professor Beth Colgan,
[P]enal disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement practices are
not neatly laid out in a discrete set of statutes . . . Ascertaining what
[restoration processes] are involves an analysis of multiple layers
of constitutional and statutory text, administrative rules, and departmental policies, and necessitates an understanding of not just voter
registration procedures but also the intricacies of each jurisdiction’s
clemency, parole, and probation systems. 59

53. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 44,
at 2316; see also Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 23 (1994) (arguing that a proliferation in statutes
afford executives substantial discretion as they coordinate policy and resolve conflicts).
54. Ben F. C. Wallace, Charting Procedural Due Process and the Fundamental
Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 647, 649 (2016).
55. Tokaji, supra note 35, at 133.
56. David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections:
Selection Methods for Local Election Officials, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 1257, 1257–58
(2006); see also Donald P. Moynihan & Carol L. Silva, The Administrators of Democracy: A Research Note on Local Election Officials, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 816, 824
(2008) (noting that federal reform mandates not only make local election administration
more complex, but also more scrutinized and constrained).
57. See EWALD, supra note 33, at 139.
58. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 83 (2006); Friedrichs Benson, supra note 52, at 372; Cherish M. Keller, Re-Enfranchisement Laws Provide Unequal
Treatment: Ex-Felon Re-Enfranchisement and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 CHIKENT L. REV. 199, 225 (2006).
59. Colgan, supra note 49, at 65–66; see also Erika Wood & Rachel Bloom, De
Facto Disenfranchisement, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 8–9 (2008),
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Evidence suggests that administrators struggle to navigate these legal layers. In interviews with local administrators in ten states, Professor Alec Ewald
found that more than a third of administrators in those states either were ignorant of or confused about their states’ eligibility laws.60 This confusion has real
consequences. For example, in the 2000 elections, even the state of Florida’s
attempt to enforce its then constitutional mandate to disenfranchise citizens
with a felony conviction was riddled with error.61 With respect to rights restoration, administrative discretion and confusion tends to result in more exclusionary policies than legally required.62

II. ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND THE COSTS OF VOTING RIGHTS
RESTORATION
As suggested in the previous section, the American federalist system of
elections and the resulting administrative discretion affect the implementation
of disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement laws. Even operating under the
exact same legal mandate, election administrators’ actions may vary as a result
of a complex interaction of factors.63 The decentralized and autonomous license under which election administrators operate tends to exacerbate the problem and may prevent citizens from voting rights restoration.64 While the variation in election administration can seem random or unpredictable at first
glance, the concept of administrative burden can help explain how administrators implement policy and why even statutes with the most generous rights restoration language may not result in de facto reenfranchisement.65
Administrative burden consists of the costs an individual might experience in her interactions with government.66
The consideration of
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/09.08.DeFacto.Disenfranchisement.pdf [perma.cc/8NW8-AUT9] (suggesting
that laws are difficult to understand and require expertise in multiple fields).
60. EWALD, supra note 33, at 141.
61. Guy Stuart, Databases, Felons, and Voting: Bias and Partisanship of the Florida Felons List in the 2000 Elections, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 453, 474 (2004). These errors
were the result of, inter alia, data quality problems and variation in local election supervisor administration. Id. at 461. The distribution of these errors was highest in highpurge Republican counties. Id. at 474.
62. EWALD, supra note 33, at 140.
63. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion and Accountability in State Welfare Administration, 71 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 4 (1997); Patrick G.
Scott, Assessing Determinants of Bureaucratic Discretion: An Experiment in StreetLevel Decision Making, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 35, 37–39 (1997).
64. See Allen, supra note 50, at 424; Melissa C. Chiang, Some Kind of Process for
Felon Disenfranchisement, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331, 1353 (2005).
65. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 3 (1980); Burden et al., supra note 30, at 749.
66. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 22.
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administrative burden begins with a few relatively uncontroversial assumptions. First, most can agree that citizens are better off when administrators
implement policy in a fair, accessible, and respectful manner. However, all
interactions between citizens and government generate some costs.67 Government actors must invest time, financial resources, and energy in making and
implementing policy.68 Likewise, citizens invest time, financial resources, and
effort into complying with government policy.69 When acting in their capacity,
public officials seek to minimize these costs while protecting important public
values.70 For example, in election administration, public officials often balance
the need for accessibility, dependability, and security against the financial and
political cost of doing so.71
Aspects of both government and its citizens affect these costs, or administrative burdens. Relative to other policies, policies that enable citizen participation or are targeted at specific groups are more likely to generate costs as
administrators devote time and resources to implementation.72 Additionally,
because citizens’ resources vary, administrative burdens affect some groups
more than others.73 This is particularly true with respect to election administration and rights restoration policy.74 Yet, citizens are comparatively unaware of
the effects of administration in this context. As a result, policymakers can and
do adjust administrative burden to achieve political objectives.

A. Administrative Capacity and Policy Implementation Costs
Policy implementation is generally a repetitive and onerous process.
Structural factors related to the organizations that implement policy influence
Id. at 21; Burden, et al., supra note 30, at 741.
Burden, et al., supra note 30, at 742.
Id.
HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 13.
E.g., H.R. Res. 1, 116th Cong. (2019); CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE,
H.R. 1, FOR THE PEOPLE ACT OF 2019 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55003
[perma.cc/5JEN-ZC45]; Brian Pascus, House Passes H.R. 1, A Sweeping Anti-Corruption
and
Voting
Rights
Bill,
CBSNEWS
(March
8,
2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-passes-hr-1-sweeping-anti-corruption-and-voting-rights-legislation-today-2019-03-08/ [perma.cc/CBW8-A6HP].
72. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 21; Burden et al., supra note 30, at 742;
Donald P. Moynihan, Normative and Instrumental Perspectives on Public Participation: Citizen Summits in Washington, D.C., 33 AM. R. PUB. ADMIN. 164, 165 (2003).
73. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 13.
74. See, e.g., EWALD, supra note 33, at 146 (reasoning that variation in policy implementation leads to practical disenfranchisement); RONALD HAYDUK, GATEKEEPERS
TO THE FRANCHISE, SHAPING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN NEW YORK 7 (2005) (arguing that practical disenfranchisement occurs for those who have the greatest difficulty in overcoming disparate election practices and technology (low-income citizens,
first-time voters, minority populations, etc.)); Allen, supra note 50, at 430–31 (discussing how administrative costs impose different levels of disenfranchisement).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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this implementation.75 As election administrators perform their jobs, these administrators face competing factors that influence how they make decisions.76
Because election administrators rarely operate in a centralized organization,
under clear decision rules, or with effective training, they vary in their implementation of the law and interaction with citizens.77 For example, local jurisdictions repeatedly and consistently report administrative challenges in registering voters, and these challenges – exacerbated by the tremendous variation
in jurisdictional resources and composition78 – make it hard to ensure uniform
implementation of enfranchisement.79
This means that considerations of rights restoration policy are complicated by the fact that even if reenfranchisement is legally possible, administrative capacity may prevent effective administration.80 As utilized in this Article,
the concept of administrative capacity is simply the ability of administrators to
perform the tasks the law and political principals assign to them.81 When enacting legislation to restore voting rights to citizens with felony convictions,
lawmakers should consider three aspects of administrative capacity: financial
resources, administrative expertise, and organizational structure.

1. Financial Resources
First, financial resources affect an administrative agency’s ability to take
on administrative burden and to shift the costs of policy implementation from

75. Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Malay Majmunder, Administrative Exclusion: Organizations and the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY
827, 828–29 (2010); Burden et al., supra note 30, at 742; see also Joe Soss, Richard
Fording & Sanford F. Schram, The Organization of Discipline: From Performance
Management to Perversity and Punishment, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 203, 205–
06 (finding that performance management pressures affect how decentralized case
managers interact with their clients).
76. See Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1152; Soss et al., supra note 75, at 219.
77. See R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Building Secure and Transparent
Elections through Standard Operating Procedures, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 828, 830
(2008).
78. Compare, for example, the City of Los Angeles to a town in Missouri with 500
residents.
79. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., VIEWS OF SELECTED LOCAL ELECTION
OFFICIALS ON MANAGING VOTER REGISTRATION AND ENSURING ELIGIBLE CITIZENS
CAN VOTE
11,
16
(2005),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247944.pdf
[perma.cc/L36Y-UHG8]; Kimball & Baybeck, supra note 37, at 141; Merivaki, supra
note 10, at 71; Tokaji, supra note 35, at 130–31.
80. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 376 (2012).
81. See John J. Gargan, Consideration of Local Government Capacity, 41 PUB.
ADMIN. R. 649, 651–52 (1981).
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citizens.82 Research demonstrates that the resources provided to the administrators who interact most often with citizens are often inadequate and only become more deficient as demands for administrators’ services increase over
time.83 This is certainly true in election administration, where the most universal complaint from those on the front-lines concerns a lack of resources.84
Furthermore, like with most other aspects of elections, federalism and the
complexity of the electoral process make it very difficult to determine the financial cost of voter education and registration, election regulation and legislation, and results certification. As put by researchers at the National Conference of State Legislators, “No one knows how much it costs to run elections in
the United States.”85 The total cost is likely astronomical. For example, in
2018, Congress approved $380 million in grants simply for states to improve
election security – administrators referred to the money as a “a 10-cent solution
to a $25 problem.”86
Like with most other aspects of election administration, states fund their
electoral systems differently. In some states, local governments bear the entire
financial burden of election administration, and in others, state governments
reimburse localities for electoral costs.87 As an increasing number of state and
local governments face financial crises, election administration often suffers;88
when public officials face fiscal pressure, election administration does not rank

82. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 31; see also Bryan D. Jones, Saadia R.
Greenberg, Clifford Kaufman & Joseph Drew, Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 164
(1977) (ability of administrators to process claims is inversely related to number of
clients and social well-being).
83. LIPSKY, supra note 65, at 27.
84. Robert S. Montjoy, The Changing Nature . . . and Costs . . . of Election Administration, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 867, 868 (2010).
85. Katy Owens Hubler & Wendy Underhill, Election Costs: Who Pays and With
Which
Funds?,
26
LEGISBRIEF
1
(2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=y7G5AApY0KI%3d&tabid=32195&p
ortalid=1 [perma.cc/CCK9-8CUY].
86. Ashley Lopez, Local Officials Call Federal Election Funds “A 10-Cent Solution to a $25 Problem”, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/04/634707340/local-officials-call-federal-electionfunds-a-10-cent-solution-to-a-25-problem [perma.cc/9GZB-ZK74].
87. SHANTON, supra note 22, at 9–11; Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 44, at 2324–25.
88. Montjoy, supra note 84, at 868.
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high on the priority list.89 Furthermore, the allocation of those resources that
public officials do have tends to be influenced by political factors.90
This means that most states and localities are not well situated financially
to administer rights restoration.91 For example, in its assessment of the financial impact of Florida's Amendment 4, the Office of Economic and Demographic Research – the research agency of the Florida state legislature – found
that the Amendment would result in increased costs to local governments, to
the Florida Departments of State and Corrections, and to state circuit courts.92
Even if one accounted for revenues obtained by requiring citizen payments of
court-ordered restitution, fines, and court costs before voter registration, state
and local governments would still need significant additional financial resources in order to implement restoration policy; “Florida has no system to
track restitution, and creating one could cost millions of dollars.”93
2. Administrative Expertise

ity.

In addition to financial resources, administrative expertise affects capacAdministrators develop skills and knowledge, which, when granted

89. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 10 (2014), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-VotingExper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [perma.cc/AWG3-PLHA].
90. Zachary Mohr, JoEllen V. Pope, Martha E. Kropf & Mary Jo Shepherd, Strategic Spending: Does Politics Influence Election Administration Expenditure, 63 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 427, 434 (2019).
91. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 90.
92. STATE OF FLA., OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, FIN. IMPACT
ESTIMATING CONF., COMPLETE INITIATIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENT
VOTING RESTORATION AMENDMENT (2016), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitutional-amendments/2018Ballot/VRA_Report.pdf [perma.cc/S4DY-5ZZR]; see also
Mike Schneider, Official Tells Florida Democrats to Expect Recount in 2020, ASS’N
PRESS (June 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/official-tells-floridademocrats-to-expect-recount-in-2020/2019/06/08/91d0b66a-8a16-11e9-9d73e2ba6bbf1b9b_story.html?utm_term=.704c8b14bbc6 [perma.cc/4YK7-7LPN] (Florida Democrats hope to employ 15,000 lawyers and volunteers around the state to help
monitor election administration); c.f. Marl Schlakman, Walt McNeil, & Ion Sancho,
Here’s What You Haven’t Heard About Restoring Ex-Felon’s Voting Rights, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-op-felon-rightsrestoration-florida-analysis-20181009-story.html [perma.cc/6CT7-P7V2] (suggesting
that, during the 1970s, Governor Reubin Askew’s restoration regime reduced costs to
taxpayers).
93. Lawrence Mower & Emily L. Mahoney, House Passes Amendment 4 Bill Requiring Felons to Pay Up Before They Can Vote, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 24, 2019)
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article229619604.html.
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discretion in policy implementation, they can use to make decisions.94 This
notion of expertise is inherent when it comes to almost every aspect of administrative action – from decisions about whether or not (and how) to regulate, an
agency’s creation of procedures, and an agency’s interpretation of its own policy.95
However, administrative expertise is complex and multifaceted.96 Due to
a wide array of individual and institutional factors, administrators vary in their
acquisition of subject-matter and institutional knowledge.97 Expertise is costly
to acquire, and even those administrators who serve in their agencies for long
periods of time may only obtain experience with routines, as opposed to gaining policy skills.98 Administrators who lack institutional and policy knowledge
may shift the cost of implementation to citizens. Furthermore, those administrators who acquire policy expertise may use their knowledge to administer
policy in a way that differs from the preferences of the legislature or the public.99
A consistent problem in election administration is that many administrators (a) lack the expertise to understand fully their states’ electoral laws and
regulations and (b) are incapable of navigating the labyrinth of administrative
organizations involved in any one policy.100 Election administrators have little

94. See Generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
95. E.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); Decker

v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 612–14 (2013); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
461–63 (1997); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435
U.S. 519, 544–45 (1978).
96. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative
Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1105
(2015).
97. E.g. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 876 (2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1422, 1426 (2011).
98. James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 371 (1976).
99. E.g., D. RODERICK KIEWIET AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF
DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991);
Francis E. Rourke, Variations in Agency Power, in BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN
NATIONAL POLITICS (Francis E. Rourke ed., 1976). Administrators who have more experience can use their skills to overcome or increase burden. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra
note 14, at 32.
100. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon
Voting Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 43 (2015); Alec Ewald, A
“Crazy-Quilt” of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law, THE SENT’G PROJECT 8 (2005), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Crazy-Quilt-of-Tiny-Pieces-State-and-Local-
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training or access to educational material and face confusing and contradictory
laws and policies.101 In their discussions with about 100 election administrators, Professors Kathleen Hale, Robert Montjoy, and Mitchell Brown found
that an increase in professionalism, a decrease in the number of organizational
layers involved in elections, and more streamlined procedures would significantly improve the elections administration landscape.102 This is particularly
true in the area of felon disenfranchisement and reenfranchisement as scholars,
citizens, and administrative officials alike puzzle over the parameters of rights
restoration.103

3. Organizational Structure
Finally, organizational differences influence administrative capacity. Because agencies are organized to address specific problems, their structures and
processes shape policy implementation by prioritizing and organizing administrative action.104 Over time, these organizational schemes can generate a culture that recognizes some tasks as more important than others and can enhance
administrators’ autonomy in performing those tasks.105
Adding a new policy mandate to an agency’s mix of responsibilities
makes administrators’ tasks more complex.106 It can become difficult, if not
impossible, for administrators to follow all laws and policies in their entirety.107
While statutory law may occasionally provide guidance, most agencies have
freedom to determine which tasks to prioritize.108 This means that
Administration-of-American-Criminal-Disenfranchisement-Laws.pdf.
[perma.cc/5FQP-TAG].
101. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 89; Erika Wood, Restoring the Right to
Vote, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 14 (2d ed. 2009), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Restoring%20the%20Right%20to%20Vote.pdf [perma.cc/X2MK-FMZZ]; Wood & Bloom,
supra note 59, at 1–6.
102. KATHLEEN HALE, ROBERT MONTJOY & MITCHELL BROWN, ADMINISTERING
ELECTIONS: HOW AMERICAN ELECTIONS WORK 144 (2015).
103. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 84; Christopher Uggen, Angela Behrens
& Jeff Manza, Criminal Disenfranchisement, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 318
(2005).
104. SAMUEL WORKMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT 38 (2015).
105. DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 15–25
(2001).
106. Robert S. Montjoy & Laurence O’Toole, Jr., Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 465, 465 (1979)
(noting that new tasks likely compete with old ones).
107. Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1138.
108. Young Han Chun & Hal G. Rainey, Goal Ambiguity and Organizational Performance in U.S. Federal Agencies, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 529, 529 (2005);
Chan Su Jung, Extending the Theory of Goal Ambiguity to Programs: Examining the
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administrators’ choices about how to direct their attention becomes a decision
not just about policy prioritization but also about the areas on which not to
focus energy.109 In this way, structural factors influence the administration of
elections.110
While communication of policy priorities and procedures can alleviate
some of these concerns, such communication is often lacking in election administration.111 Despite the fact that, in most states, the Secretary of State oversees, implements, and interprets election directives from all authorities – federal and state legislative, executive, and judicial – few states have centralized
procedures for rights restoration.112 This leaves lower level administrators with
a great deal of discretion and responsibility.113 How administrators act in the
face of such discretion can be the result of organizational features that affect
the administrators’ work environments and can lead to variation in how different administrators implement the same law.114
Another organizational consideration is the number of agencies or bureaus involved in implementing a single policy. Challenges can arise when
multiple units are involved in administration. While examples of administrative redundancy abound in the American political system, involving several
agencies in the same policy can reduce the chances of successful implementation.115 Like with other aspects of organizational structure, coordination tools
such as consultation requirements, interagency agreements, and centralized gubernatorial review can help alleviate some of these challenges.116 Yet it is often

Relationship Between Goal Ambiguity and Performance, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 205,
206 (2014); Hal G. Rainey, A Theory of Goal Ambiguity in Public Organizations, in
RESEARCH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, vol. II (J.L. Perry ed., 1993).
109. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND
INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); see also Amber E. Boydstun, Shaun
Bevan, & Herschel F. Thomas III, The Importance of Attention Diversity and How to
Measure It, 42 POL. STUDIES. J. 173, 176 (2014).
110. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 46,
at 2325.
111. See SHANTON, supra note 22, at 15–17 (2019) (discussing variation in the relationship between state and local election administrators and in agency size and structure).
112. Benson, supra note 52, at 344; Ewald, supra note 101, at 3.
113. Ewald, supra note 100, at 12. Empirical studies raise concern that, in the face
of such discretion, conscious or unconscious ideological views will influence administrators’ decision-making. Tokaji, supra note 35, at 133.
114. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 32–33.
115. Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 274, 274–76 (2003).
116. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1155–81 (2012).
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up to agency heads to coordinate overlapping jurisdictions and to determine
organizational forms.117
This is particularly true with respect to rights restoration, where there is
little to no communication between election administrators and members of the
criminal justice system.118 The interaction required between election officials,
state courts, corrections officers, and probation systems poses administrative
barriers to rights restoration.119 For example, after Florida passed Amendment
4, the Secretary of State failed to update voter registration forms for eight
months.120 This left potential voters, county supervisors, and corrections and
probation officers to make decisions about eligibility that contradicted forms
provided by the state. In response to this procedural and similar confusion, the
state legislature considered allocating $2 million to hire more administrators
on the Florida Commission on Offender Review to help evaluate applications
and provide information to local supervisors of elections.121

B. Individual Experience with the Administrative State
Just as election administration imposes costs on administrators, policy
implementation imposes burdens on individual citizens. State and local governments’ construction and implementation of voting and election rules and
processes affect how citizens experience administrative burden.122 Even in the
unlikely event all administrators implement such rules equally, the effects of
administration will be different depending upon citizen characteristics.123 A
citizen’s decision whether to seek public benefits or to engage with government
officials depends in part on that individual’s resources and interpretation of the
people and processes that control the encounter.124 Accounting for the citizen

117. See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 427

(2015).
118. Wood & Bloom, supra note 59, at 9.
119. Wallace, supra note 54, at 680–81.
120. See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Their Rights Restored, Felons in Florida Begin Reg-

istering to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2019, at A10.
121. Lawrence & Mahoney, supra note 93. The final text of the Voting Rights
Restoration Act, passed by the legislature and sent to the governor for signature on May
3, 2019, mandates change to the uniform statewide voter education application. SB
7066, 2019 Cong., 1st Sess. (Fla. 2019) (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)).
122. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 21–22.
123. Brodkin & Majmunder, supra note 75, at 832, 843.
124. Carolyn Y. Barnes & Julia R. Henly, “They Are Underpaid and Understaffed:” How Clients Interpret Encounters with Street-Level Bureaucrats, 28 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. THEORY 165, 165 (2018).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6

1018

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

characteristics that affect this interpretation, particularly for the socially and
economically disadvantaged, is a key aspect of policy implementation.125
Individual experience is especially important with respect to voting and
rights restoration. Temporary voting bans may be permanent in practice as
informal obstacles bar citizens from regaining rights.126 The individual experiences of disenfranchised citizens illustrate this point. For example, in most
cases, an overwhelming majority of citizens with felony convictions do not
register to vote even after their rights are restored.127 Through their interactions
with government and public officials, citizens learn lessons about how citizens
and governments interact; public programs communicate information about
citizen status and government process.128 For many citizens, the criminal justice system is the most frequent, visible, and direct government contact.129 The
civic education provided by that contact can place learning, compliance, and
psychological burdens on individuals who seek to engage with other aspects of
government.

1. Learning Costs
Individuals who wish to engage in some sort of civic activity must spend
time and effort learning about the activity, identifying access points, ascertaining eligibility, and satisfying procedural requirements.130 With respect to voting, citizens must collect information about how, where, and when to register
and vote.131 A lack of or inaccurate information about voting rights and
125. James Fossett & Frank J. Thompson, Administrative Responsiveness to the
Disadvantaged: The Case of Children’s Health Insurance, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
THEORY 369, 371 (2005).
126. Allen, supra note 50, at 389; Cammett, supra note 80, at 353.
127. E.g., Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Why Letting Ex-Felons Vote Probably
Won’t
Swing
Florida,
VOX
(Nov.
2,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/11/2/18049510/felon-voting-rights-amendment-4-florida [perma.cc/JPS2-FTZX]; Editorial, Virginia Makes Every Voter Count,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/opinion/virginiamakes-every-voter-count.html [perma.cc/4K2F-9TYL].
128. Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political
Action, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 363, 364, 376 (1999).
129. Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral
State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010).
130. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 23; Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba &
Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 272 (1995); Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at 48.
131. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 8 (1980)
(“These are not costless acts; at the very least they require forfeiting or postponing the
opportunity to do something else that might be more pleasurable.”); Ethan Porter & Jon
C. Rogowski, Partisanship, Bureaucratic Responsiveness, and Election Administration: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 28 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 602, 602
(2018).
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registration is a real concern among citizens with felony convictions.132 In
Florida, citizens with felony convictions struggle to interpret the conditions for
registration, even after the passage of legislation designed to clarify the process.133
Given the limitations related to administrative capacity outlined above,
many states shift the burden of ascertaining eligibility and satisfying the procedural requirements for rights restoration to citizens. For example, in budget
negotiations following the passage of Amendment 4, Florida State Senator Jeff
Brandes said, “Obviously, the individual is responsible for determining
whether they’ve completed all the terms of their own sentence. If they have
questions, they should go to the local supervisors of elections.”134 Not only do
Florida citizens with felony records likely have to check with local supervisors
of elections regarding rights restoration, but citizens must check their official
case status online with the county court and, for cases at least twenty years old,
may need to travel to the courthouse to view their case file in person.135 Learning costs such as these, combined with the recognized costs associated with
registering to vote generally, discourage legally eligible voters from registering.136
132. Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 248, 251 (2000); Meredith &
Morse, supra note 100, at 43; Wallace, supra note 54, at 681; Ernest Drucker & Ricardo
Barreras, Studies of Voting Behavior and Felony Disenfranchisement Among Individuals in the Criminal Justice System in New York, Connecticut, and Ohio, THE SENT’G
PROJECT 8–9 (2005), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/fd_studiesvotingbehavior.pdf [perma.cc/L3ND-QGX4].
133. Elina Shirazi, Florida’s Felons Face Unexpected Obstacles Before Voting in
2020, FOX NEWS (July 31, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/after-new-billfloridas-former-felons-face-unexpected-obstacles-before-voting-in-2020
[perma.cc/3TQH-Z4H6].
134. Mower & Mahoney, supra note 93. In another example, Virginia’s governor
announced rights restoration in 2016, but the state gave priority to those individuals
who specifically requested such restoration. Press Release, Governor McAuliffe’s Restoration of Rights Policy (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/all-releases/2017/mcauliffe-administration/headline-826606-en.html
[perma.cc/8SP3-5ZNB].
135. Langston Taylor, How Felons Can Register to Vote in Florida Under New
Amendment 4 Bill, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 26, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/05/26/how-felons-can-register-to-vote-in-floridaunder-new-amendment-4-law/ [perma.cc/C779-2LD8].
136. Estelle H. Rogers, Restoring Voting Rights to Former Felons, PROJECT VOTE
1 (2014), http://www.projectvote.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/POLICY-PAPERFELON-RESTORATION-MARCH-2014.pdf/ [perma.cc/UF8V-42Y5].
Conversely, information outreach can increase registration. Alan S. Gerber, Gregory
A. Huber, Marc Meredith, Daniel R. Biggers & David J. Hendry, Can Incarcerated
Felons Be (Re)integrated into the Political System? Results from a Field Experiment,
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912, 913, 915–17 (2015) (discussing effects of packet of information about registering to vote ex-offenders receive when leaving prison).
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Administrators, purposefully or not, can increase or decrease the costs
associated with acquiring this information.137 An increase in these costs is particularly problematic if administrators have some discretion in the performance
of their jobs, as that discretion may result in differential treatment across specific groups of citizens.138 Discretion can allow individual level factors to influence administrative decision-making. For example, the discretion built into
voter identification laws allows for election administrators to, consciously or
subconsciously, act upon racial stereotypes.139 Evidence suggests that local
election officials provide different information about voter ID laws to potential
voters of different ethnicities.140 If similar patterns exist with respect to the
provision of information about voter eligibility, then the racial or other biases
of administrators may lead to differential treatment of citizens with felony convictions. Classification of citizens as “felons” reinforces social stereotypes by
making status a salient factor in decision-making.141 These stereotypes are
only exacerbated by the fact that citizens who have extended contact with the
criminal justice system tend to come from lower socio-economic backgrounds142 and from ethnic minorities.143
137. Sebastian Jilke, Wouter Van Dooren & Sabine Rys, Discrimination and Administrative Burden in Public Service Markets: Does a Public-Private Difference Exist,
28 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 423, 424 (2018); Porter & Rogowski, supra note 131,
at 603.
138. Lonna Rae Atkeson et al., A New Barrier to Participation: Heterogeneous Application of Voter Identification Policies, 29 ELEC. STUD. 66, 71 (2010); Katherine Levine Einstein & David M. Glick, Does Race Affect Access to Government Services? An
Experiment Exploring Street-Level Bureaucrats and Access to Public Housing, 61 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 100, 101 (2017); Rose Ernst, Linda Nguyen & Kamilah C. Taylor, Citizen
Control: Race at the Welfare Office, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1283, 1305 (2013); Jilke et al.,
supra note 137, at 424–25; Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1134; Sanford F. Schrom,
Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording & Linda Houser, Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice,
and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 398, 401
(2009); see also Lipsky, supra note 11, at 3–6 (describing how largely obscure administration of social policy through routine activity can attenuate the relationship between
the state and its citizens); Ariel R. White, Noah L. Nathan & Julie K. Faller, What Do
I Need to Vote? Bureaucratic Discretion and Discrimination by Local Election Officials, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 129, 130 (2015) (finding that differences in resource
constraints or professionalization of administrators cannot explain bias in providing information about voting procedures).
139. Atkeson et al., supra note 138, at 70.
140. White et al., supra note 138, at 130.
141. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Why Status Matters for Inequality, 79 AM. SOC. REV.
1, 4–5 (2014).
142. E.g., Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before and After Incarceration, ECON. STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 8–10; 12–16 (2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [perma.cc/V4T4-CVZ4].
143. E.g., Kevin Morris, Thwarting Amendment 4, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2
(2019),
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2. Compliance Costs
Even if individuals overcome the learning costs associated with rights restoration, there are compliance burdens as well. Compliance costs include the
provision of documentation to demonstrate eligibility and the financial cost of
accessing services.144 The compliance costs associated with voting are well
documented.145 The institutional requirement of first registering to vote and
then voting creates two separate processes that differ in time, place, and kind
to which citizens must dedicate resources.146 Just as with learning costs, citizens vary in their ability to allocate resources to registration and voting, and as
a result, reforms designed to lower compliance costs often have dissimilar effects on different groups of citizens.147 Empirical evidence suggests that registration reforms often have disparate impacts because of variation in citizens’
ability to assume the costs of voting.148
With respect to the restoration of voting rights for citizens with a felony
conviction, one particular aspect of compliance cost has received the most attention. Many states require citizens to complete payment of restitution, court
costs, and other judicial debt to regain voter eligibility.149 The implementing
legislation related to Amendment 4 provides an example. The law requires that
citizens must complete all terms of the sentence related to their felony convictions, including (a) release from imprisonment; (b) termination of probation,
community control, or any term ordered by a court as part of the sentence; and
(c) termination of any supervision, including full payment of restitution, fines,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05_FloridaAmendment_FINAL-3.pdf [perma.cc/484F-M2AT] (finding that over 40 percent of individuals released from prison in Florida were black).
144. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 23.
145. E.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36–50; 260–
276 (1957); William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 26 (1968).
146. WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 131, at 8–9 (1980); G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. SCI. R. 17,
26 (1986); Richard J. Timpone, Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United
States, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 145, 145 (1998). As of January 2019, sixteen states and
the District of Columbia allow qualified citizens to register and vote on the same day.
Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Apr. 17, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx
[perma.cc/4UCD-MFC3]. An additional state (North Carolina) permits same day registration for some early voting, but not on Election Day. Id.
147. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & James White, Election-Day Registration and Turnout Inequality, 22 POL. BEHAV. 29, 41 (2000).
148. Id.
149. E.g., Cammett, supra note 80, at 387–91; Colgan, supra note 49, at 66–85;
Keller, supra note 58, at 212–16 (2006); Jill E. Simmons, Beggars Can’t be Voters:
Why Washington’s Felon Re-enfranchisement Law Violates the Equal Protection
Clause, 78 WASH. L. REV. 297, 318–20 (2003).
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and fees.150 Opponents of the legislation argue that the requirement creates
compliance costs that run contrary to the spirit of the Amendment and that the
legislation will have a disparate impact on those who lack the resources to pay
such costs.151

3. Psychological Costs
In addition to learning and compliance costs, a well-discussed aspect of
the administrative burden of felon disenfranchisement and rights restoration is
psychological cost. In the context of burden, psychological costs result from
the stigma that comes from applying for and/or participating in a particular
government program, the frustration that often results from interaction with
public officials, the stresses that arise from negotiating complex processes, and
the loss of individual autonomy that can accompany intrusive administrative
procedures.152 Citizens can see government as a pervasive presence in their
lives, particularly if they have limited resources.153 Citizen-government interaction can reinforce an individual’s perception that she lacks political power
and social standing.154 In response, regardless of want or need, citizens may
opt out of government participation to avoid the psychological burden.155
Administrative practices can become degrading, intrusive, and directive,
erode citizen autonomy, and create the perception that interaction with the government only goes one way.156 Through experience, citizens can view administrators as sovereign actors who are unresponsive to individual needs and who
render objections to policy both futile and unwise.157 As a result, citizens’ limited options are compliance or exit.158

150. SB 7066, 2019 Cong., 1st Sess. (Fla. 2019) (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)).
151. Daniel A. Gross, The Fight for Voting Rights in Florida Isn’t Over, NEW

YORKER (May 10, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-fight-forvoting-rights-in-florida-isnt-over [perma.cc/3VS5-2J73]; P.R. Lockhart, Florida Legislature Approves Bill Requiring Felons to Pay Fines and Fees Before Voting, VOX
(May 3, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/3/18528564/amendment-4-florida-felon-voting-rights-fees [perma.cc/K4L5-M6EF]; Lawrence Mower,
Florida Republicans Reach Amendment 4 Deal: Felons Must Pay, but Judges Can
Waive Costs, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2019/05/03/florida-republicans-reach-amendment-4-deal-felons-mustpay-but-judges-can-waive-costs/ [perma.cc/5KEG-72UK].
152. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 13.
153. Soss, supra note 128, at 366.
154. Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at 50.
155. Jones et al., supra note 82, at 151; Moynihan, et al., supra note 17, at 49.
156. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 25 (2018); Moynihan et al., supra note
17, at 49.
157. Soss, supra note 128, at 367 (1999).
158. Id. at 366.
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The stigma of a felony conviction and the accompanying loss of the right
to vote reinforce these psychological costs.159 Interactions with the criminal
justice system often influence a citizen’s perception of her own autonomy and
political standing; government becomes a place where officials make decisions
affecting citizens’ lives without their input and where process can objectify and
alienate.160 Indeed, the legal and political justification of disenfranchisement
policy hinges on categorization of citizens and reinforces the idea of felons as
a separate class or group.161 Given this, and the fact that the right to vote is
itself a social convention,162 the psychological cost of a felony record likely
inhibits voting registration.163 As put by one individual with a felony conviction when asked about his ability to vote, “I don’t even think about it actually
. . . I mean I’ve been failing at that kind of stuff for so long, I just assume I
can’t vote. I don’t think I can have that right ever again.”164

C. Policymaking Through Administration
The combination of the influence of administrative capacity and individual experience on policy implementation suggests that administrative burden
is “policymaking by other means.”165 Changes in administrative burden can
generate behavioral responses in both administrators and citizens that result in
specific policy outcomes.166 Yet administrative burden is poorly understood

159. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at 151–55; Ariel White, Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters, 113
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 311, 312 (2019); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 163 (2010) (“My felony conviction has been like a mental punishment, because of all the obstacles . . . ”);
Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999, 3006
(2015) (“Because of their stigmatizing effects, the collateral legal consequences of
criminal conviction have come to represent a modern day scarlet letter . . . ”).
160. Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral
State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818–19 (2010); Rogers, supra note 136, at 5.
161. KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 127
(2005); Cammett, supra note 80, at 370–75; Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa
Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI 281, 299–303 (2006).
162. EWALD, supra note 33, at 9.
163. ALEXANDER, supra note 159, at 160–64; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 58, at
9.
164. David S. McCahon, Combating Misinformation in the Ex-Felon Population:
The Role Probation and Parole Agencies Can Play to Facilitate Civic Reintegration in
the United States, 63 PROBATION J. 9, 16 (2016).
165. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 33; Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at
52.
166. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 35; Porter & Rogowski, supra note 131,
at 603.
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by the public, making it extremely valuable as a policy tool.167 Policymakers
can alter administrative burden with seemingly neutral statutory or regulatory
language presented as apolitical procedural fixes.168 For example, Florida State
Senator Dennis Baxley, chair of the Florida Senate Ethics and Elections Committee, stressed that there is a role for politicians in rights restoration because
“procedures are needed.”169
There are few policy areas where considerations of administrative burden
are of more consequence than in election administration. Election law and administration tends to be couched in neutral language and promoted as designed
to improve managerial goals such as efficiency or to pursue democratic values.170 However, “[e]lections are contests for power and, as such, it is natural
that politics will influence every part of the contest, including the administration of elections.”171 Political self-interest is the predominant motivation behind most election legislation,172 and attitudes towards administrative burden
are relatively predictable; the policy preferences of political actors correlate
with stances on the nature of burden and the distribution of cost across citizens
and government.173
Certainly, this is true when it comes to felon disenfranchisement and
rights restoration policy. Discussion of the topic inevitably leads to speculation
about the partisan leanings of citizens with felony convictions and the electoral
consequences. For example, in the debate surrounding the passage of Amendment 4, Professors Marc Meredith and Michael Morse estimated that, if all
Florida citizens with felony convictions had been eligible to vote in the 2016
elections, there would have been approximately 102,000 additional votes for
the Democratic Party, 54,000 more votes for the Republican Party, and 40,000
surplus votes that could have been cast for either party.174 If correct, these
estimates signal meaningful differences in a state where about 100,000 votes
decided the last presidential election (2016), 10,000 votes the last Senate election (2018), and 30,000 votes the last governor’s election (2018).175 This
Moynihan et al., supra note 17, at 52–53.
HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 35–36.
Rivero, supra note 4.
See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 36, at 762.
COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS
49
(2005),
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Exhibit%20M.PDF
[perma.cc/3RCF-PVR8].
172. Claire Foster Martin, Block the Vote: How a New Wave of State Election Laws
is Rolling Unevenly over Voters and the Dilemma of How to Prevent It, 43 CUMB. L.
REV. 95, 125 (2012).
173. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 36; Moynihan, supra note 17, at 52.
174. Meredith & Morse, supra note 127.
175. Florida Results, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/florida [perma.cc/Q4FZ-AHTK]; Florida Results, N.Y. TIMES (May
15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-florida167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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suggests that adjusting the statutory language that influences administrative
burden can have real political consequences.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IN ACTION: FLORIDA’S AMENDMENT 4
The implementation of Florida’s Amendment 4 provides an example of
the implications of administrative burden for the restoration of voting rights for
citizens with felony convictions.176 Like all states, Florida has limited resources and therefore the State and its local governments must balance the use
of these resources and the protection of important public values. Because
Amendment 4 is targeted to address the needs of a subset of the population and
to enable the participation of that population, implementation is administratively costly.
Amendment 4 went into effect on January 8, 2019.177 However, questions
arose among policymakers and administrators regarding interpretation and implementation of the Amendment.178 On May 3, 2019, the Florida State Legislature passed a bill designed to address some of the administrative challenges
posed by Amendment 4.179 Governor Ron DeSantis signed the bill into law on
June 28, 2019.180 An examination of the law’s provisions and consideration of
the state’s administrative capacity, citizen experiences, and political circumstances illuminates the potential effects of the legislation.

A. Provisions of Implementing Legislation
First, the law addresses voter applications and requires that the Secretary
of State change the uniform statewide voter registration application to include
three different categories into which a citizen must place herself: applicant has
never been convicted of a felony; applicant has been convicted of a felony and
her rights have been restored by the Board of Executive Clemency; or applicant
has been convicted of a felony and her rights have been restored by
elections.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=6145C264CE0AF08981E94397F45F69E1&gwt=pay
[perma.cc/ZL9F-SS97].
176. See Lawrence Mower, Amendment 4: The House is Hearing the First Bill Tomorrow. Here’s What’s In It, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/2019/03/18/amendment-4-the-house-is-hearing-the-first-billtomorrow-heres-whats-in-it/ [perma.cc/9KH8-5ZKM].
177. Emily L. Mahoney & Langston Taylor, Amendment 4: Is Attempted Murder
the Same As Murder?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/03/12/amendment-4-exception-may-deny-votingrights-for-felons-sentenced-for-attempted-murder/ [perma.cc/6PD9-XJ9D].
178. E.g., id.; Mower, supra note 176.
179. Voting Rights Restoration Act, SB 7066, 2019 Cong., 1st Sess. (Fla. 2019)
[hereinafter Voting Rights Restoration Act] (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)).
180. DeSantis, supra note 6.
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Amendment 4.181 Once the citizen places herself into one of the three categories, the supervisor of elections for the county in which the citizen resides must
determine whether the applicant is eligible to vote.182 With respect to felony
convictions, a citizen is not eligible unless she has completed all terms of her
sentences as contained in the four corners of her sentencing document.183 This
includes release from imprisonment; termination of probation or community
control; fulfillment of any term as ordered by the court as part of her sentence;
termination from any supervision; and full payment of restitution, fines, or
fees.184 In order to aid each county supervisor of elections in determining eligibility, the law provides for the Department of State to compare “information
received from, but not limited to, a clerk of the circuit court, the Board of Executive Clemency, the Department of Corrections, the Department of Law Enforcement, or a United States Attorney’s Office.”185
The law also requires administrators to provide information to citizens.
The Department of Corrections shall inform and educate inmates and offenders
on community supervision about the restoration of rights and notify citizens of
outstanding sentence terms upon release from incarceration, probation, or community control.186 Additionally, the Florida Commission on Offender Review
must notify a citizen of all the outstanding terms of her sentence at the time of
termination of Commission supervision.187 To assist the Commission with this
task, the Department of Corrections must send the Commission a monthly electronic list of the names of individuals who may be eligible for rights restoration.188
Recognizing that the changes provided by the new law likely will result
in unforeseen complications to the restoration process, the legislature mandated
the creation of a Restoration of Voting Rights Work Group within the Department of State.189 This Work Group, comprised of individuals from the Departments of Corrections, Law Enforcement, and State, the Florida Commission on
Offender Review, state circuit courts, and county supervisors of elections, shall
conduct a comprehensive review of the process of verifying potential voters
who may be eligible for restoration of voting rights.190 The Work Group must
submit a report to the legislature by November 1, 2019, providing recommendations related to the consolidation of data relevant to the implementation of
Amendment 4 and the process of informing citizens about eligibility.191
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Voting Rights Restoration Act § 21 (amending Fl. St. § 97.052 (2019)).
Id. at § 23 (amending Fl. St. § 98.045(a) (2019)).
Id.
Id. at § 25 (creating Fl. St. § 98.0751 (2019)).
Id. at § 24 (amending Fl. St. § 98.075) (2019)).
Id. at §§ 27, 29, 31 (amending Fl. St. §§ 940.061, 944.705, 948.041 (2019)).
Id. at § 30 (amending Fl. St. §947.24 (2019)).
Id. at § 27 (amending Fl. St. § 940.061 (2019)).
Id. at § 33.
Id. at § 33(1).
Id. at § 33(4).
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B. Administrative Complications
While the law does provide some procedural framework for the implementation of Amendment 4, administrators still have considerable latitude in
creating the formal rules and procedures that will govern rights restoration.
This leeway, combined with the informal rules and norms that will inevitably
develop as a result, can influence the de facto restoration of rights.192 In the
face of discretion, administrators who perceive a higher administrative burden
reduce the chances of policy implementation.193 For example, the Secretary of
State can determine whether to offset some of the burdens created by the statutory requirements for voting eligibility and registration with efforts to promote participation.194 Yet, this creates additional burden for administrators.
Therefore, it is equally possible that the Secretary of State may increase citizen
costs by administering statutory requirements in a way that increases barriers
to access.195 An examination of the law’s likely impact on administrative capacity, individual factors, and political implications suggests that administrative burden will likely impede voting rights restoration in Florida.
1. Administrative Capacity
First, the law involves three different types of administrative agencies –
those in charge of the coordination of election policy (e.g., Department of
State); those in charge of election administration (e.g., county election supervisors and offices); and those that are part of the criminal justice system (e.g.
Florida Commission on Offender Review).196 If all agencies do not have the
same capacity, or capacity is unevenly distributed across or within units, then
problems with policy implementation will likely arise as administrators who
perceive a higher burden will oppose new policy adoption and support shifting
administrative tasks to other units.197 While coordination between the agencies
can help alleviate some concern, the law largely leaves communication up to
agency heads. For example, the law requires various units to share information
relating to voter eligibility but does not mandate a procedure for doing so.198
Each of these agencies has a finite amount of financial resources, and it
is unlikely that future budget allocations will reflect the additional tasks the law
requires of the agencies. At a minimum, the Secretary of State must change
voter registration forms to reflect new statutory language and ensure the use of
those new forms. This is no small task, as the state has a history of problems
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See Keiser & Soss, supra note 11, at 1138.
Burden et al., supra note 30, at 749.
Benson, supra note 52, at 367–68.
Id. at 367.
Voting Rights Restoration Act § 33.
Burden et al., supra note 30, at 749.
Voting Rights Restoration Act § 25.
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resulting from county supervisors’ of elections delay in the implementation of
policy changes.199 In addition to adopting the new voter registration materials,
county supervisors of elections will also have to invest resources in processes
to determine voter eligibility and to sift through information provided by other
agencies. While these tasks are related to the agencies’ central purpose, the
tasks allocated to the Departments of Corrections, Law Enforcement, and Florida Commission on Offender Review are arguably indirectly connected to their
missions. The Florida Department of Corrections oversees the third largest
prison system in the country;200 the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s
primary mission is to promote public safety;201 and the Florida Commission on
Offender Review serves as a quasi-judicial body that makes determinations regarding parole and other releases.202 When faced with the tasks directly related
to these missions and the additional burden of rights restoration, administrators
are likely to pass the costs of restoration to citizens.
Furthermore, the budgets of the Departments of Corrections and Law Enforcement and the Florida Commission on Offender Review have remained
relatively stable over time, with slight increases in the 2018–19 budget that are
unrelated to the restoration of voting rights for citizens with felony convictions.203 The Department of State’s elections budget was more than double that
of years similarly placed in the election cycle.204 However, 54% of that budget
($20,392,786.75) came from federal grants, and over 75% of those grants
($15,450,000.00) was dedicated to election security.205 The legislature only
allocated $2 million to county supervisors of elections for use in all election
199. FL. DEP’T OF STATE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY &
EFFICIENCY IN FLORIDA ELECTIONS 6–7 (2013), https://dos.myflorida.com/media/693815/secretarys-report-on-recommendations-2013.pdf [perma.cc/J8AT-83DJ]
(noting county supervisor delay in implementing changes relating to realignment of
precincts, ballots, and election technology).
200. About the Florida Department of Corrections, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR.,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/about.html [perma.cc/WT4F-SGE3].
201. About FDLE, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENF’T, https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/AboutUs/About-Us.aspx [perma.cc/G99B-3XK6].
202. Organization
Overview, FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REV.,
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/overview.shtml [perma.cc/D56P-65G7].
203. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Operating Budget 2018–2019, FLA. EXEC. OFF. OF THE
GOVERNOR,
http://transparencyflorida.gov/OperatingBudget/Ledger.aspx?FY=19&BE=70000000&OB=Y&SC=F
[perma.cc/3KGT4HTG]; Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf. Operating Budget & Fla. Comm’n on Offender Review
2018–19 Operating Budget, FLA. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, http://transparencyflorida.gov/OperatingBudget/Agency.aspx?FY=19&BE=78000000&SC=F
[perma.cc/BSS7-8GRB].
204. Fla. Dep’t of State 2018-19 Elections Operating Budget, FLA. EXEC. OFF. OF
THE
GOVERNOR,
http://transparencyflorida.gov/OperatingBudget/AgencyDetailLevel.aspx?FY=19&BE=45100200&SC=F&OB=N
[perma.cc/FQW63Y2K].
205. Id.
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administration activities and limited fund distribution to those counties that
provided certification of matching funds in an amount equal to 15% of the
amount to be received from the state.206
In addition to financial constraints, these agencies (and their administrators) face expertise and organizational challenges. Understanding the requirements contained in the law necessitates legal analysis and a knowledge of
where to look to access information about voter eligibility. Yet, any experience
administrators gain over time relating to voter eligibility and registration is
likely routinized and not policy-specific. Training and guidance documents
can help overcome this lack of administrative expertise, but the law does not
provide for such instruction. When administrators are faced with a multitude
of tasks and limited resources and knowledge, they are likely to choose to perform tasks with which they have familiarity rather than devoting energy to acquiring new expertise.
The organizational structure of Florida’s electoral system only exacerbates the problem. Consider, for example, the Department of State. The Secretary of State serves as chief election officer207 and has the legal responsibility
for “implementing, operating, and maintaining, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive, computerized statewide voter registration system.”208 Yet, elections are not the Secretary’s sole policy focus. The Department of State consists of six divisions
tasked with wide authority, from formalizing the legal standing of Florida businesses to promoting funding and programs for the arts.209 The division of the
Department of State responsible for the election administration is the Florida
Division of Elections, which itself consist of three subunits.210 None of these
subunits are directly responsible for voter registration, which is delegated to
local supervisors of elections. The Division of Elections’ Bureau of Voter Registration Services assists county Supervisors of Elections with the voter registration process, but it does not control the appointment, removal, or funding of
those Supervisors. Each Supervisor of Elections is elected by voters in her
county and the county’s board of county commissioners pays her compensation.211
Such a complicated organizational scheme can create coordination and
implementation problems. Even if one set of administrators devotes time and
energy into understanding the new legal framework implementing Amendment
4, another set of administrators within the same agency may thwart their efforts
due to differential organizational missions, resources, and expertise.
S.B. 2500, 2019 Cong, 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019).
Fla. St. § 97.012 (2019).
Fla. St. § 98.035(1) (2019).
About the Department, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, https://dos.myflorida.com/about-the-department/ [perma.cc/EH4J-X4ZK] (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).
210. About Us, FLA. DIV. OF ELEC., https://dos.myflorida.com/about-the-department/ [perma.cc/9WJP-UQXR].
211. Fla. St. § 98.015(1)–(2) (2019).
206.
207.
208.
209.
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2. Individual Experience
Second, even if administrative capacity did not provide roadblocks to administration, citizens’ interpretation of the processes necessitated by the law
likely will inhibit restoration of voting rights to citizens with felony convictions. The individual learning and compliance costs inherent in the law are
quite high. Florida has prevented citizens with felony convictions from voting
for the past 150 years.212 Even in the wake of a public campaign advertising
the passage of Amendment 4, citizens with felony convictions may not be
aware of its effects. Public attention to the Amendment largely focuses on
those who already know the potential implications of Amendment 4, as opposed to providing less politically engaged citizens with information regarding
voter registration.213 Groups such as Florida Rights Restoration Coalition recognize this problem and are working on visiting communities and encouraging
civic participation: “We basically remind everybody that the impact of Amendment 4 is intact, that the lifetime ban is history, and we’re now looking at a
situation where we have about 800,000-plus who are immediately eligible, and
about 500,000-plus who are not yet eligible because of financial obligations.”214
The citizens in the latter category, who are not eligible for rights restoration because of outstanding court fines, fees, or restitution, have received considerable attention in recent months. As discussed above, these obligations are
a type of compliance cost that may prevent individuals with felony convictions
from being able to restore their voting rights.215 Estimates from the Florida
court system suggest that over 80% of financial obligations will remain unpaid
because the defendant does not have the resources to do so.216 As put by Julie
Ebenstein, a senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) Voting Rights Project, the administrative barriers in the law “nearly
guarantee that people will miss election after election . . . because they cannot

212. Letitia Stein, Politics Cloud Felon Voting Rights Restoration in Florida,
REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-florida-felons/politics-cloud-felon-voting-rights-restoration-in-florida-idUSKBN1OE0C
[perma.cc/5HVZ-3BZM].
213. Maruam Saleh, How Some Florida Prosecutors are Pushing Back Against
GOP Voter Suppression Efforts, THE INTERCEPT (July 15, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/07/15/florida-voting-rights-amendment-4/
[perma.cc/D9FX-5FPA]
(statement of Neil Volz, deputy director of the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition).
214. Id. (statement of Neil Volz, deputy director of the Florida Rights Restoration
Coalition).
215. Id.
216. Daniel Rivero, Felons Might Have to Pay Hundreds of Millions Before Being
Able to Vote in Florida, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (WLRN) (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/felons-might-have-pay-hundreds-millions-being-able-voteflorida [perma.cc/M67S-6TU7].
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afford to pay financial obligations[.]”217 On June 28, 2019, in conjunction
with the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Brennan Center for Justice, a group of citizens who have outstanding financial obligations sued Florida election officials over the constitutionality of the new
law.218 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the law’s requirement that a citizen must pay all outstanding judicial debt before her rights are automatically
restored under Amendment 4 violates the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Twenty-Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.219 In its Order
Granting a Preliminary Injunction, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida held that Florida cannot deny rights restoration
because an individual does not have the financial resources to pay outstanding
debt.220
In addition to the learning and compliance costs, there are also large psychological costs to rights restoration in Florida. Most discussion of Amendment 4 and its implementing legislation reinforces the notion of citizens with
felony convictions as a separate class of citizens. For example, in debate over
provisions of the law, State Representative James Grant argued on the House
floor, “The affected class disenfranchised themselves when they committed a
crime.”221 Rhetoric such as this, combined with the fact that citizens must separately identify themselves on voter registration forms, make citizens more
likely to opt out of government participation. Indeed, the plaintiffs in the suit
challenging the constitutionality of the law argued that the law’s effect is
217. Jane C. Timm, Florida Republicans Move to Limit Felon Voting Rights Despite
Constitutional
Amendment,
NBC
NEWS
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/florida-republicans-move-limitfelon-voting-rights-despite-constitutional-amendment-n985156
[perma.cc/RS8QSY6M].
218. Complaint, Gruver v. Barton et al., No. 1:19-CV-00121 (N.D. Fla. June 28,
2019) (consolidated with Jones et al. v. Desantis et al., No. 4:19-CV-00300, 2019 WL
5295192 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019)).
219. Id. (First Amendment-based claims for relief include unconstitutional burden
on core political speech and associational rights. Fourteenth Amendment-based claims
for relief include: violation of the doctrine of fundamental fairness; unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; unconstitutional burden on
the right to vote; violations of procedural due process; and intentional race discrimination. Twenty-Fourth Amendment-based claim includes unconstitutional poll tax. The
complaint also includes a claim for retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution).
220. Jones et al. v. Desantis et al., No. 4:19-CV-00300, 2019 WL 5295192, at *11
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019). The Court went on to state that Florida must adopt procedures that permit qualified individuals to register and vote if they are unable to pay
outstanding financial obligations. Id. at *13.
221. Veronica Stracqualursi, Florida House Passes Bill That Would Require ExFelons Pay All Fees Before Exercising Voting Rights, CNN (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/25/politics/florida-amendment-4-voting-rights-felons/index.html [perma.cc/LT7T-SGXL].
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disenfranchising in part because it reinforces long-standing disparities along
racial and socio-economic lines.222
3. Political Effects and Potential for Change
When considering the balance of administrative and citizen costs associated with policy implementation, it is important to consider the political preferences of the actors involved in administrative policymaking.223 With respect
to implementation of Amendment 4, those actors include state legislators, the
Secretary of State, and county election supervisors. First, as elected officials,
state legislators have an incentive to keep statutory language relatively
vague.224 Legislators can claim credit for enacting vague legislation and leave
administrators to translate a general mandate into a functioning program, a process that inevitably involves “the trampling of numerous toes.”225 When constituents become frustrated with the administration of policy, legislators can
blame administrators and then intervene with “technical fixes.”226
In such a system, it is important to consider whether the key administrators involved in the policy process are elected or appointed. The decentralization and discretion inherent in election administration provides administrative
policymakers with the opportunity to make decisions based on political
goals.227 With respect to electoral reform, administrative preferences differ
depending on job description and method of selection. Policy managers tend
to be more concerned with costs and efficiency than with normative goals such
as equal representation.228 Elected officials are more likely to be responsive to
public pressure.229

222. Complaint, Gruver v. Barton et al., No. 1:19-CV-00121 (N.D. Fla. June 28,

2019).
223. See Daniel Palazzolo, Vincent G. Moscardelli, Meredith Patrick & Doug Roubin, Election Reform after NAVA: Voter Verification in Congress and the States, 38
PUBLIUS 515, 531 (2008).
224. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT 46 (2d ed. 1989).
225. Id.
226. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 36.
227. See COMM’N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM, supra note 171, at 50; see also Richard
C. Fording, Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, Devolution, Discretion, and the Effect of
Local Political Values on TANF Sanctioning, 81 SOC. SERV. REV. 285, 286 (2007).
228. Moynihan, supra note 72, at 165.
229. Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Stephane Lavertu, Kenneth R. Mayer &
Donald P. Moynihan, Selection Method, Partisanship, and the Administration of Elections, 41 AM. POL. RES. 903, 906 (2013); see also COMM’N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM,
supra note 171, at 51 (arguing that state chief elections officers should remain insulated
from political pressure through fixed terms of appointment and clear lines of responsibility).
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The primary manager of election policy in Florida is the Secretary of
State.230 In contrast to the majority of states, Florida’s Secretary of State is an
appointed official.231 The Governor appoints the Secretary, subject to confirmation by the state Senate, and the Secretary serves at the pleasure of the Governor.232 For the purposes of implementation of the law and Amendment 4,
this is notable for two reasons. First, gubernatorial appointment combined with
at-will removal means that the Secretary of State likely is more responsive to
the Governor than to any other political actor. In this way, the Secretary provides the Governor with an opportunity to gain control over administrative policymaking and to tailor procedures to gubernatorial political interests.233 Second, to the extent that the Secretary of State adopts policies to implement the
law, she likely is more concerned about the managerial aspects of election administration than about citizen responsiveness.
Unlike the Secretary of State, each of the sixty-seven county supervisors
of elections is elected every four years.234 In theory, this structure generates
incentives for administrators to be more accountable to citizens’ needs and to
support policies that reflect citizen preferences.235 However, when the burden
to drive legislative or administrative policy change falls on citizens with little
political clout, those citizens tend to be less successful.236 Elected officials
have little incentive to respond to those citizens who lack political power or are
viewed as “undeserving.”237 As a class of potential voters, citizens with felony
convictions fall within this category and therefore have limited ability to hold
elected administrators accountable for policy implementation.238

FLA. STAT. § 97.012 (2019).
SHANTON, supra note 22, at 12–13.
FLA. STAT. § 20.10(1) (2019).
See e.g. Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington, THE BROOKINGS INST. 68–76 (1977); DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS (2008); Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in
THE NEW DIRECTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 245 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
234. FLA. STAT. § 98.015(1) (2019). States vary in selection and removal of local
election administrators, but the majority of states have elected officials. Note, Toward
a Greater State Role in Election Administration, supra note 44, at 2316.
235. Susan M. Miller, Administering Representation: The Role of Elected Administrators in Translating Citizens’ Preferences into Public Policy, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. THEORY 865, 869 (2013).
236. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation,
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1161–62
(2004) (arguing that disenfranchisement laws operate as a sanction that reduces the
political clout of entire communities).
237. Fossett & Thompson, supra note 125, at 370; Moynihan & Herd, supra note
12, at 663–64.
238. See Brodkin, supra note 63, at 20 (finding that welfare clients’ limited capacity
for self-advocacy makes it difficult for those clients to hold the state accountable).
230.
231.
232.
233.
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The court system provides only modest hope of remedy in this situation.
Notably, litigation challenging administrative action is hard to pursue, particularly for the economically disadvantaged.239 In the area of election administration, litigation tends to come at points of crisis, rendering the courts “less like
an advancing army charging in to dominate a territory and more like a fire brigade that has been summoned when half the building is already engulfed in
flames.”240
Even then, a consistent theme in election law jurisprudence is a high level
of deference to administration, and the judicial preference for as-applied challenges give states greater discretion in their administrative processes.241 Courts
have struggled with how to weigh administrative burden, legislative ambiguity,
and administrative discretion, particularly in the context of voting rights.242
This struggle is even more apparent with respect to the restoration of the voting
rights of citizens with felony convictions.243 Before the passage of Amendment
4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted the tension between
the potential for disparate treatment and the political consequences resulting
from administrative burden and established standards for Equal Protection
challenges.244 Yet the Court ultimately held that, without more, demonstration
of a lack of administrative standards is insufficient as a legal argument.245
239. Id. at 24–25.
240. Wise, supra note 29, at 131–32.
241. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202–03 (2008); Wash.

State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–58 (2008); Joshua
A. Douglas, The Significance to the Shift toward As-Applied Challenges in Election
Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 637 (2009); Ariel White, Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The Demobilizing Effects of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters, 113 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 311, 322 (2019); see also Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127–29
(2019) (distinguishing between as-applied and facial challenges); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2010) (providing for two types of facial attacks: (a) establishment that no set of circumstances exists under which a statute is constitutionally
valid or (b) demonstration that the vast majority of applications of the statute are unconstitutional).
242. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 252.
243. See Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1836, 1837–38, 1847 (2013) (a series of narrow rulings in election administration makes it difficult to articulate the appropriate framework for determining when
state procedures violate equal protection); Simmons, supra note 149, at 310, 313–16
(noting that re-enfranchisement is an unsettled area of law); Wallace, supra note 53, at
680 (suggesting that procedural due process challenges may be appropriate to challenge
felon re-enfranchisement procedures).
244. Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2018) (staying Hand v.
Scott, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (N.D. Fla. 2018)).
245. Id. at 1210. The court noted,
Since a standardless reenfranchisement scheme, without more, does not state a
claim for an Equal Protection violation based on invidious discrimination, it
likely follows that a standardless scheme, without more, cannot establish a First
Amendment violation based on viewpoint discrimination.
While a
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Subsequently, both parties agreed that the passage of Amendment 4 rendered
the litigation moot because the Amendment created a non-discretionary system
of voting rights restoration.246
From the perspective of administrative burden, the post-Amendment 4
actions of the plaintiffs in that case are illuminating. Of the nine plaintiffs, two
applied for restoration but were ineligible because of outstanding court costs.247
A third plaintiff did not apply for restoration at all.248 Interestingly, with respect to the latter, the state of Florida noted that because she had not applied
for restoration, the state lacked “knowledge whether she has any outstanding
obligations.”249 This means that one-third of the individuals who, by pursuing
litigation in the first place, have revealed themselves to be exceptionally motivated to regain their voting rights failed to do so after the passage of Amendment 4. One can assume that the rate of failed restoration will be even higher
in the general population.

CONCLUSION
The example of Florida’s Amendment 4, subsequent legislative decisions,
and likely citizen experience with administrative burden suggests that attention
to statutory language of various voting rights regimes or to the constitutionality
of felon disenfranchisement misses a significant point: the key to the success
or failure of citizen rights restoration policy lies with the administrative state.
Even seemingly accommodating procedural language like Florida’s interagency information sharing requirement complicates the administrative process and strains already limited agency budgets. The combination of limited
administrative capacity and the learning, compliance, and psychological costs
citizens with felony convictions must pay to restore their voting rights places
significant hurdles in the way of rights restoration. This is not to say that rights
restoration for disenfranchised citizens with felony convictions is impossible,

discretionary felon-reenfrancisement scheme that was facially or intentionally
designed to discriminate on viewpoint – say, for example, by barring Democrats, Republicans, or socialists from reenfranchisement on account of their political affiliation – might violate the First Amendment . . . no such showing has
been made in this case.

Id. at 1211–12.
246. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 5, Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206 (11th
Cir. 2018) (No. 18-11388-G); Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 1, Hand v. Scott,
888 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-11388-G).
247. Supplemental Brief for the Appellants at 4, Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206 (11th
Cir. 2018) (No. 18-11388-G).
248. Id. at 4 n.1. As a result, parties did not have access to that Plaintiff’s CCA. Id.
249. Id. One wonders how individual citizens are supposed to obtain this information if the state of Florida lacks it.
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or even improbable. Just that the “focus of attention should shift from rules
governing elections to the institutions responsible for running them.”250
Politicians recognize the importance of institutions and how statutory or
regulatory language presented as apolitical technical solutions to administrative problems can have real policy consequences. As noted by David A. Graham in his April 2019 piece on voting rights restoration in The Atlantic, conversations about voting rights in the abstract are useful for deliberate and principled policymaking, but “hashing out the nitty-gritty” of administration is a
political game.251 Instead of discussing rights restoration in the abstract, politicians in Florida are making consequential administrative decisions about how
Amendment 4 will work in practice.252 This demonstrates how even the best
laid plans often go awry in the face of administrative burden, or “policymaking
by other means.”253

250. Tokaji, supra note 34, at 126; see also COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM,
supra note 170, at 57 (“[W]e need to understand better how elections are administered”).
251. David A. Graham, A Voting-Rights Debate Reveals Why Democrats Keep Losing, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/democrats-republicans-felon-voting-florida/588010/ (“In short, while
Democrats are engaged in a largely theoretical exercise on the national level, Republicans are moving aggressively to achieve their political goals at the state level”).
252. Id.
253. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 14, at 33.
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